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Synopsis
Members of the General Assembly requested that we review the South
Carolina Department of Transportation’s (SCDOT) procedures for awarding
road paving contracts. We reviewed the level of competition among
contractors for SCDOT’s road paving contracts and the department’s internal
controls for detecting bid-rigging or other forms of anti-competitive
behavior. We found evidence to indicate that the level of competition for
some road paving contracts is less than optimal in certain geographic areas of
the state. This is not necessarily the result of anti-competitive practices by
contractors. However, SCDOT does not conduct a regular analysis of bidding
patterns to ensure that the state’s bidding process for road paving and road
construction is open and competitive. 
Although we focused on road paving, the recommendations in this report
could be applied to all of SCDOT’s road construction projects. Our findings
are summarized below.
“ We analyzed all 496 road paving projects put out for bid by SCDOT
between FY 95-96 and FY 00-01. We found that nearly one-half, (49%)
of the projects, had two or fewer bidders, and 12% of the projects had
only one bidder (see p. 7). 
“ We examined the geographic distribution of road paving projects. We
identified 13 counties in which the top company had over 70% of the
market. We also examined the 12 counties where there was more than
$10 million in road paving contracts awarded between FY 95-96 and
FY 00-01. We found that, in four of these counties, the top two
companies accounted for over 95% of the market (see p. 9).
“ Improved competition could result in lower costs for road construction
projects. We compared SCDOT’s project cost estimates to the low bids
for projects where there was a single bidder and those for projects with
multiple bidders. We found that the average of the low bids on single bid
projects was 5% above SCDOT’s cost estimate while the average of the
low bids for projects which had multiple bidders was 4% below the cost
estimate (see p. 12). 
“ SCDOT does not conduct a formal analysis of bidding patterns to detect
anti-competitive behavior. Over the last five years SCDOT has spent
$246,000 leasing a computer software system for analyzing bidding
patterns but has not used the system. The department expects to begin
regular analysis of bids in 2003 (see p. 13). 
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“ SCDOT has not monitored how closely it has met guidelines
recommended by the federal government for the accuracy of engineers’
cost estimates for construction projects. The Federal Highway
Administration (FHWA) recommends that the engineer’s estimate be
within 10% of a project’s low bid at least 50% of the time. For road
paving projects SCDOT’s engineers’ estimates have met the guideline.
However, for all road construction projects, the department’s estimates
have been within 10% of the bid less than 50% of the time (see p. 15). 
“ SCDOT’s bid opening procedures increase the likelihood of bid-rigging.
Once a month, the department opens contractors’ bids for paving and
road construction projects at a hotel in Columbia. The deadline for
submitting bids expires at the same time bids are opened. The night
before bids are due, many contractors stay in the hotel at discount rates
obtained by SCDOT. This process can make collusion among contractors
easier (see p. 17). 
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Chapter 1
Introduction and Background
Audit Objectives Members of the General Assembly requested that we conduct an audit of theSouth Carolina Department of Transportation’s procedures for awarding road
paving contracts. In particular, the requesters wanted to ensure that the
bidding process is open and competitive. Our specific objectives are listed
below. 
“ Determine the extent to which contractors have acted in an open and
competitive manner when submitting bids for road paving projects. In
particular, examine the extent to which competition has varied among
geographic regions. 
“ Determine whether SCDOT has adequate internal controls in place to
prevent and detect anti-competitive practices among contractors
bidding on road paving projects. 
Scope and
Methodology
The period covered during this audit was primarily FY 95-96 through
FY 00-01. Our sources of evidence included: 
• SCDOT bid documents for road paving projects.
• Federal and state antitrust laws.
• SCDOT financial records. 
• Publications of the United States Department of Justice. 
We interviewed officials with SCDOT, the South Carolina Attorney
General’s office, and the State Law Enforcement Division. 
We also contacted the Federal Highway Administration, the Antitrust
Division of the United States Department of Justice, and the Federal Trade
Commission. We obtained information from other states and private
organizations, such as the American Association of State Highway and
Transportation Officials (AASHTO). We used limited, non-statistical
samples as indicated in the audit. In cases where we relied on SCDOT’s
computerized data, we performed a limited review of management controls
over the data. This audit was conducted in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards. 
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Background The South Carolina Department of Transportation’s mission is to provide asafe and efficient transportation system. A major part of that mission is
building and maintaining the state’s system of roads and bridges. South
Carolina has the fourth largest state-maintained highway system in the
nation. It consists of over 41,000 miles. Table 1.1 shows the composition of
the system. 
Table 1.1: Composition of South
Carolina’s Highway System Interstate  830 miles
Primary (US/SC)  9,400 miles
Secondary 31,000 miles
Source: SCDOT Legislative Briefing.
A total of 65% of South Carolina’s roads are state-maintained compared to a
national average of 21%. 
The SCDOT is funded primarily through a motor fuel tax of 16¢ per gallon
of gasoline. For road construction projects, SCDOT receives funds from the
Federal Highway Administration in the form of a match of approximately
80%. Table 1.2 shows SCDOT’s funding for FY 01-02. 






Operations and Administration 80.0




In FY 00-01, SCDOT awarded over 197 road construction contracts with
contract amounts totaling $638 million. In that period, road paving contracts
totaled over $68 million. 
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SCDOT’s Bidding
Process
Before requesting bids for a project, SCDOT’s district engineers develop
construction plans. Next, SCDOT’s Office of Preconstruction arrives at a
cost estimate. About once a month, SCDOT issues an “invitation for bids” on
road paving and road construction contracts. The contracts usually consist of
multiple road paving and/or road construction projects located within one or
more counties. 
Each contractor is required to be pre-qualified by SCDOT. Bids include an
overall contract price as well as unit prices for components of the project.
Contractors are required to submit sealed bids by a certain date. Once a
month, SCDOT opens the bids at a public meeting held in a Columbia hotel.
The department reserves the right to reject any and all bids for a project and
rebid the project. 
Road Paving Asphalt is made by mixing rock and sand (over 90%), liquid asphalt (6%),
and lime (1%) at a high temperature. This procedure takes place at various
asphalt plants located around the state. Once the asphalt is produced, it must
immediately be trucked to the road site and laid. Since asphalt must be
applied hot, plants normally must be within a one-hour drive time of the road
site, or the temperature of the asphalt will be too low. Thus, the proximity of
the asphalt plant to the road paving project is an important factor in
determining whether a company will bid on a project and the total bid
amount. The closer the asphalt plant is to the roads to be paved, the more
likely the contractor will bid and the lower the bid will be. We identified 25
companies and 55 asphalt plants certified by SCDOT to perform state work
in South Carolina. Figure 1.3 shows the approximate location of these asphalt
plants in the state.
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Number of Asphalt Plants for
Each Company
 1 = 8 plants 
 2 = 1 plant
 3 = 2 plants
 4 = 1 plant
 5 = 1 plant 
 6 = 1 plant 
 7 = 1 plant
 8 = 1 plant
 9 = 1 plant
 10 = 3 plants 
 11 = 1 plant
 12 = 1 plant 
 13 = 3 plants 
 14 = 1 plant
 15 = 1 plant
 16 = 1 plant
 17 = 2 plants
 18 = 1 plant 
 19 = 1 plant
 20 = 8 plants
 21 = 1 plant
 22 = 2 plants 
 23 = 3 plants 
 24 = 8 plants
 25 = 1 plant 
Figure 1.3: Location of Asphalt Plants in South Carolina
 Certified to Perform State Work (June 2001)*
*In addition to the asphalt plants in South Carolina, SCDOT officials report that there are nine plants in Georgia and North Carolina that are certified to
perform work in South Carolina. There are also eight asphalt plants in South Carolina that are NOT certified to perform state work.
Source: DHEC’s Bureau of Air Quality.
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Bid-Rigging Bid-rigging occurs when competitors agree in some way to affect the
outcome of the bidding process. Market allocation occurs when bidders
divide markets. A competitor may agree to sell only to customers in certain
geographic areas and refuse to sell to customers in geographic areas allocated
to other companies. In the case of government contracts, bid-rigging results
in increased costs to the state, and ultimately, the taxpayer, for goods and
services purchased from the private sector. 
In the 1980s, highway bid-rigging was uncovered in a number of states,
including Florida, Georgia, and North Carolina. These investigations resulted
in a number of convictions and millions of dollars in fines and restitution to
the states. 
Evidence of bid-rigging and other forms of anti-competitive behavior can be
collected in two ways. One way is through direct evidence, such as testimony
of a participant. Another way is through circumstantial evidence, such as
suspicious bid patterns, travel and expense reports, and telephone records. 
Federal and State Law The federal Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. §1) states that “[e]very contract,
combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.” The U.S.
Department of Justice reports that the Sherman Act “. . . prohibits any
agreement among competitors to fix prices, rig bids, or engage in other anti-
competitive activity.” For example: 
• Companies may not intentionally submit bids that are too high to have a
chance of winning so that a pre-determined company will have the low
bid. 
 
• Companies may not agree to take turns submitting the low bid. 
• Companies may not have agreements in which each company is allocated
a certain geographic territory.
• Companies may not agree to lose contracts intentionally in exchange for
subcontracts from the winning company.
Chapter 1
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In addition to bid-rigging, it is illegal for a contractor to gain excessive
market share through mergers and acquisitions with other companies. The
federal Clayton Act (15 U.S.C.§18 ) prohibits mergers or acquisitions where
the effect is “. . . substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a
monopoly.” Section 39-3-10 (c) of the South Carolina Code of Laws states: 
All arrangements, contracts, agreements, trusts, or combinations . . .
between two or more individuals, firms, corporations, syndicates or
associations that may lessen or affect in any manner the full and free
competition in any tariff, rates, tolls, premium or prices in any
branch of trade, business or commerce are declared to be against
public policy, unlawful, and void. 
There are state and federal agencies that can investigate anti-competitive
activities. The federal Department of Justice has an antitrust division which
will respond to complaints concerning anti-competitive behavior. The
Federal Trade Commission has authority to examine company mergers for
potential anti-competitive effects. State law allows the Attorney General to
prosecute companies and individuals who violate state antitrust and unfair
trade practices statutes. 
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Chapter 2
Audit Results
In this chapter we review the extent of competition among contractors for the
Department of Transportation’s road paving contracts. In addition, we
examine SCDOT’s internal controls for deterring and detecting anti-
competitive behavior. We found evidence to indicate that the level of
competition for some road paving contracts is less than optimal. The
department does not conduct a formal analysis of bidding patterns as
recommended by the Federal Highway Administration. 
Bid Data Analysis One of our audit objectives was to determine if contractors had acted in anopen and competitive manner when submitting bids for highway projects. In
particular, we examined the number of bids submitted for each road paving
project and the extent to which competition has varied among the state’s
geographic regions. 
Number of Bids Per
Project
We analyzed the number of bids per project for all 496 road paving projects
put out for bid between FY 95-96 and FY 00-01. Federal Highway
Administration technical advisory T 5080.4 indicates that it is more difficult
to ensure “adequate competition” when there are fewer than six bidders. A
U.S. Corps of Engineers study found that a minimum of seven bidders is
needed to ensure that a competitive price is paid for a project. 
We found that less than 5% of SCDOT’s road paving projects had more than
four bidders. Nearly one-half, (49%) of the projects, had two or fewer
bidders, and 12% of the projects had only one bidder. Table 2.1 shows the
number of bids per project. 
Chapter 2
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Table 2.1: Number of Bids per







1      58   12%
2    185   37%
3    147   30%
4     87   18%
5    15     3%
6      3     1%
7      1     0%
TOTAL 496 100%
* Figures may not add due to rounding. 
Source: LAC Analysis of SCDOT bid data.
We also found that three companies accounted for 53 (91%) of the single bid
projects. Table 2.2 shows the percentages of single bid projects by company. 









A 23   40%
B 19   33%
C 11   19%
All Others   5     9%
TOTAL 58 100%
* Figures may not add due to rounding. 
Source: LAC Analysis of SCDOT bid data. 
In one county, we found that 7 (70%) of the 10 projects put out for bid
between FY 95-96 and FY 00-01 had only one bidder. 
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We examined the geographic distribution of road paving projects and found
several areas of the state where one company was awarded most of the
paving work in that area. Figure 2.3 shows that in three of SCDOT’s seven
districts, one company within each district had over two-thirds of the total
market share between FY 95-96 and FY 00-01. In the other four districts, no
company had more than 35% of the market. 
Figure 2.3: Districts Where One Company had Over Two-Thirds of the Total Market Share
FY 95-96 — FY 00-01
Source: SCDOT bid data and DHEC permit records.
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% = Percentage of Market Share to
One Company
$ = Total Road Paving Contracts
Awarded FY 95-96 – FY 00-01
in Millions
We also examined the geographic distribution of road paving projects by
county. Of the 496 road paving projects put out for bid between FY 95-96
and FY 00-01, 392 were projects where all the roads to be paved were within
a single county. We identified 13 counties in which the top company had
over 70% of the market. Figure 2.4 shows the county, the amount (in
millions) of the paving contracts awarded to all companies between
FY 95-96 and FY 00-01, and the percentage won by a single company. 
Figure 2.4: Counties In Which the Top Company had Over 70% of the Total Market Share
FY 95-96 — FY 00-01
Source: SCDOT bid data.
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We also examined the 12 counties where there was more than $10 million in
road paving contracts awarded between FY 95-96 and FY 00-01. We found
that, in four of these counties, the top two companies accounted for over 95%
of the market. Greenville, the county with the most road paving work, had
two companies account for 66% of the market. Table 2.5 shows the counties
and the amount of the market accounted for by the top two companies.
Table 2.5: Percentage of Market
for Top Two Companies in
Counties with More Than
$10 Million in Road Paving
Contracts




Florence $10.8 million 100%
Charleston  15.9 million 100%
Horry  15.3 million   97%
Kershaw  11.9 million   96%
York  12.0 million   82%
Richland  14.5 million   82%
Sumter  10.9 million   81%
Aiken   19.5 million   77%
Spartanburg  12.7 million   71%
Lexington  12.0 million   70%
Greenville  20.1 million     66% 
Anderson  13.7 million    59%
Source: SCDOT bid data. 
 
Reasons Cited for Lack of
Competition
According to federal, state, and private officials, there are several reasons
that may account for a lack of competition in some parts of the state. First,
meeting the necessary zoning requirements can be difficult. Even though
asphalt plants are mobile, these officials stated it is difficult to move a plant
from one part of the state to another because of zoning restrictions. Second,
the cost to establish an asphalt plant can be prohibitive. Building a new
asphalt plant can cost several million dollars. Third, officials cited the
difficulty in obtaining the required environmental permits needed to operate
an asphalt plant. 
We contacted seven counties concerning their zoning restrictions for asphalt
plants. In general, counties restrict asphalt plants to areas zoned for industrial
use. However, most of these counties reported that they had no additional
restrictions for asphalt plants. DHEC is the agency responsible for issuing air
quality permits. We did not see evidence that obtaining a permit was
Chapter 2
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prohibitive. According to a DHEC official, no company has been denied a
permit to build an asphalt plant. 
Impact of Competition on
Prices
When one company dominates a certain area, it can result in lower
competition and potentially higher prices. Prior to putting a project out for
bid, SCDOT staff develop an estimate of the project’s cost. We reviewed the
437 road paving projects for which estimates were available. We compared
the estimates and low bids for the 53 road paving projects where there was a
single bidder to the 384 projects with multiple bidders. 
We found that the average of the low bids on single bid projects was 5%
above SCDOT’s cost estimate while the average of the low bids for projects
which had multiple bidders was 4% below the cost estimate. This suggests
that efforts to reduce the number of single bid projects could result in lower
prices. We estimate that if the single bid projects had multiple bidders, the
total amount awarded for these projects could have been reduced up to $5.4
million. 
Conclusion While the factors discussed above may be an indication of anti-competitive
behavior, they are not proof. For example, bids that come in well above the
engineers’ estimates may indicate anti-competitive behavior or it may be a
case of a bidder intentionally submitting a high bid because the company is
too busy to handle the additional work but wants to remain on the bidder’s
list. Indicators of anti-competitive behavior should not be considered
definitive evidence, but should lead to further investigation to determine
whether or not the behavior actually exists. 
We contacted the Antitrust Division of the United States Department of
Justice during the initial phase of our review and provided them with
background information and bid data. At that time, the department did not
see a need to open a preliminary investigation, but the department did state
that it would continue to review any and all information. We intend to
provide the department with a copy of our final report. 
Chapter 2
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Internal Controls One of our objectives was to determine whether SCDOT has adequateinternal controls to deter and detect bid-rigging and other forms of anti-
competitive behavior by road paving and road construction contractors. We
found that the department does not conduct a formal analysis of bidding
patterns as recommended by the Federal Highway Administration. 
Internal Controls in Place SCDOT has implemented some controls recommended by the Federal
Highway Administration to deter and detect bid-rigging and other forms of
anti-competitive behavior.
Below are examples of internal controls currently in place.
• As required by S.C. Reg. 63-300, section 102.1 of SCDOT’s “standard
specifications” requires that contractors be prequalified by SCDOT to
bid on road construction and paving work.
• An SCDOT official reports that before requesting bids for a project, the
department estimates the cost, but does not make the estimate public
until after a contract has been awarded. This restriction, however, is not a
written policy of the department. 
• As required by 23 CFR 635.112(f), SCDOT’s standard contract requires
bidders to sign sworn statements attesting that they have not colluded or
participated in other anti-competitive activities with regard to the project.
• Section 102.14 of SCDOT’s “standard specifications” allows SCDOT to




SCDOT does not conduct a formal analysis of bidding patterns that could
indicate anti-competitive behaviors by contractors. Since 1982, the Federal
Highway Administration has recommended that states use computer software
in:
[a] conscientious effort . . . to determine if bid-rigging is currently
ongoing or has occurred in the recent past. To make this
determination, an adequate number of projects awarded over a
sufficient time period must be evaluated. A time period of
approximately five years should be selected for the initial evaluation
to determine if any abnormal competitive bid patterns exist.
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Below are examples of areas the FHWA believes bidding pattern analysis
should address.
Number of Contracts Awarded to a Specific Firm
Is market share concentrated among one or a small number of
contractors? (see p. 7)
Consistent Percentage of the Available Work in a Geographic Area to One
Firm or to Several Firms over a Period of Time
Is there evidence that individual contractors have agreed to limit their
work to specific geographic areas? (see p. 9)
Rotation of Successful Bids among Contractors
Is there evidence that contractors take turns designating which one of
them will submit the low bid?
Consistent Percentage Differential in the Bids
Is there evidence that contractors have agreements regarding the amount
by which their bids differ?
Consistent Percentage Differential Between the Successful Bid and the
Engineer’s Estimate
Is there evidence that a contractor has obtained access to confidential
cost estimates developed by the purchaser?
SCDOT has been leasing bidding pattern analysis software from the
American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials
(AASHTO) since 1991 but has not used it. Total lease expenditures by
SCDOT from FY 97-98 through FY 01-02 were $246,000. SCDOT officials
report that their efforts to use the software have not been successful because
the department’s database pertaining to project design, cost estimation,
bidding, and project management has not been sufficiently automated. In
2002, department officials expect to complete an automated database that
will support AASHTO bidding analysis software. In 2003, the department
expects to begin regular analysis of the bidding patterns of contractors. 
Experience in Other
States
A predecessor to AASHTO’s bidding pattern analysis software was first used
in the early 1980s to prosecute road construction contractors in Florida.
Transportation officials in Florida and North Carolina currently use the
software. Although they report no recent cases of prosecution or lawsuits
resulting from bidding pattern analysis, they believe that contractors’
knowledge that the analysis is taking place deters anti-competitive behavior. 
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In 2001, a federal grand jury began investigating anti-competitive behavior
in the road paving industry in Kentucky. The state transportation agency in
Kentucky has not conducted routine statistical bidding pattern analysis since
the early 1990s but has plans to do so. 
Conclusion Conducting regular statistical analysis of bidding patterns can increase
SCDOT’s ability to deter and detect bid-rigging and other forms of anti-
competitive behavior. It is important to note that information on bidding
patterns alone may not provide definitive evidence of anti-competitive
behavior. It may be necessary to seek direct evidence, such as
correspondence, conversation recordings, or eyewitness accounts.
Recommendations 1. The Department of Transportation should conduct regular analysis of thebidding patterns of road paving contractors and road construction
contractors that do business with the state. This analysis should focus
primarily on bid-rigging and other forms of anti-competitive behavior.
2. The Department of Transportation should report any evidence of bid-
rigging or other forms of anti-competitive behavior to the appropriate
state and federal law enforcement agencies.
3. The Department of Transportation should enact a written policy
requiring that cost estimates of road paving and road construction
projects be kept confidential until after the contracts are awarded.
Engineers’
Estimates
The Department of Transportation has not monitored how closely it has met
guidelines recommended by the federal government for the accuracy of
engineers’ cost estimates for construction projects. In addition, SCDOT does
not have a written policy addressing when a bid is to be reviewed or rejected. 
Prior to putting a project out for bid, SCDOT’s engineers develop an estimate
of what a project will cost. This estimate is based on historical cost data.
According to the Federal Highway Administration, this estimate can be used
as a guide in reviewing bids. The FHWA recommends that, for at least 50%
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For road paving projects SCDOT’s engineers’ estimates have met the
guideline. However, when road paving projects are combined with all road
construction projects, the department’s estimates have been within 10% of
the bid less than 50% of the time. According to SCDOT data, in FY 99-00
the low bid was within 10% of the engineers’ estimates 45% of the time. In
FY 00-01, the percentage was 43%. 
SCDOT also does not measure the percentage of time the low bid exceeded
the engineer’s estimate by 10% or more, and has no written policy on when a
bid is to be reviewed for possible rejection. However, it does have an
unwritten guideline which states that any project on which the low bid
exceeds the engineer’s estimate by more than 10% should be examined. We
found that, for the 437 road paving projects for which estimates were
available, 56 (13%) were awarded when the low bid exceeded the engineers’
estimates by 10% or more.
When SCDOT does not meet federal guidelines, the credibility of the
estimating process may be called into question. Without measuring how
often the low bid exceeds the engineer’s estimate, SCDOT cannot be sure of
the accuracy of its estimating process. Without accurate estimates, SCDOT is
less likely to question high bids, and its review of bids for possible anti-
competitive behavior may be less effective. SCDOT may also pay more than
necessary for road paving projects. 
Recommendations 4. The Department of Transportation should annually measure how often itmeets the federal recommended guideline for the accuracy of engineers’
cost estimates. 
5. The Department of Transportation should develop a written policy
specifying when bids are to be reviewed and rejected. 
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The United States Department of Justice has noted a number of conditions
that can make it easier for contractors to collude in an effort to restrict
competition. We found that SCDOT’s procurement of road construction and
paving services exhibits some of these conditions. According to the Antitrust
Division of the Department of Justice: 
“ “Bidders who congregate in the same building or town to submit their
bids, have an easy opportunity for last-minute communications.”
SCDOT conducts its public bid openings at a hotel in Columbia. The
deadline for submitting bids and the bid opening occur at 11:00 a.m. on
the second Tuesday of each month. In a contract signed between SCDOT
and the hotel for 2001, the hotel agreed to reserve about 100 discounted
hotel rooms for highway contractors the night before each bid
submission deadline. In addition, SCDOT receives free use of a large
meeting room for its bid openings. 
SCDOT awarded this exclusive contract without allowing other hotels
the opportunity to make proposals to the department. More questionable,
however, is SCDOT’s decision to have bid openings at a hotel and
procure room discounts for contractors. These two factors encourage
contractors to congregate at the hotel the night before submitting bids,
thus increasing the likelihood of bid-rigging and other forms of anti-
competitive behavior. 
Although federal regulation 23 CFR 635.113 and SCDOT standard
specification 102.13 require that bids be opened publicly, there is no
need for the event to occur at a hotel. We found two state government
meeting rooms in Columbia, with parking, that have capacities in excess
of 200 persons. We also found no need for the state government to obtain
hotel discounts for private contractors. 
“ “Collusion is more likely if the competitors know each other well,
through social connections, trade associations, legitimate business
contacts, or shifting employment from one company to another.”
The Associated General Contractors represents approximately 80
primary road paving and road construction contractors in South Carolina.
The South Carolina Asphalt Association represents approximately 15
primary road paving and road construction contractors in the state. 
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“ “Collusion is more likely to occur if there are few sellers.”
As we note on page 7, approximately 12% of SCDOT projects between
FY 95-96 and FY 00-01 had only one bidder, while 49% had two or
fewer bidders. 
“ “Repetitive purchases may increase the chance of collusion, as the
vendors may become familiar with other bidders and [as] future contracts
provide the opportunity for competitors to share the work.”
SCDOT procures road paving and road construction services
approximately once a month. An official from SCDOT stated that
monthly bid openings increase competition by permitting smaller
contractors to bid for state projects. He also stated that bid preparation is
easier under a system of monthly bid openings.
Conclusion Ending the use of hotels for bid openings and discontinuing hotel room
discounts for contractors the night before bids are due would make the
bidding environment less favorable to collusion. However, there will
continue to be a need for ongoing analysis of bidding patterns that could
indicate bid-rigging or other forms of anti-competitive behavior (see p. 13). 
Recommendation 6. The Department of Transportation should:
• Discontinue the opening of bids at hotels and use government
facilities instead.
• Ensure that bid openings are held at a time so that contractors from
all parts of the state can comfortably drive to Columbia without
arriving a day early. 
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The South Carolina Department of Transportation’s response to South Carolina’s
Legislative Audit Council’s report “A Review of Competition for the Department of
Transportation’s Road Paving Contracts”
Recommendation #1:  The Department of Transportation should conduct regular analysis of the
bidding patterns of road paving contractors and road construction contractors that do business with
the state. This analysis should focus primary on bid-rigging and other forms of anti-competitive
behavior.
Agency Comments: The South Carolina Department of Transportation (SCDOT) is actively pursuing
the implementation of two AASHTO Transport modules, Preliminary Estimating System (PES) and
Letting and Awards System (LAS), to help monitor bidding patterns. These Systems will provide data to
the existing software (BAMS/DSS) already in place to perform the analysis noted in the recommendation.
This combination of software will provide the SCDOT the information to perform analysis that may
provide evidence of bid-rigging or anti-competitive behavior if it exists.  Training for these applications is
scheduled for January 2002 and data should be available to begin the analysis beginning in 2003.
Although there is no electronic system in place at the current time to perform this analysis, the
construction office does monitor and review all bids received on the projects and looks for unbalanced
bidding and other irregularities. 
The construction office presently reviews the three lowest bids submitted on every project.  The
bid price submitted for each project bid item is compared to the other bids and the engineer’s estimate.
This review will provide an indication of potential unbalanced bidding or other irregularities such as
previously undetected plan errors, bidder mistakes, and recent changes in field conditions.  When this
review indicates a concern, it is investigated, analyzed, and resolved to the Director of Construction’s
satisfaction before making a recommendation.
When less than three bids are received, the bid(s) are scrutinized in greater detail including
analyzing the urgency of the project.  Projects that may be considered urgent include safety
improvements, intersection improvements, widening improvements, and reconstruction/resurfacing where
the condition of road or bridge requires immediate attention. Other factors analyzed include the type/size
of the project, potential savings if the project is readvertised, geographic location of the bidders, current
market conditions and workload, and other factors that the Department of Transportation has determined
to be important.  Combinations of these factors are normally considered when analyzing the bid(s)
allowing reasonable decisions to be made by the Director of Construction.
The Director of Construction reviews the analysis of the bids with individuals who were
responsible for development of the individual projects and receives their input and comments.  He then
presents the analysis of the bids and all comments to the State Highway Engineer for each of the projects
in the letting.  The specific details for each project are reviewed, discussed and a decision is rendered for
recommendation of award or rejection.  The State Highway Engineer has also added to his staff a Deputy
State Highway Engineer who will become involved in this process.
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The location of asphalt plants in reference to the project has an effect on whether it is practical for
a company to bid on a particular project.  Also, certain types of asphalt mixes require higher quality
materials. This requirement may limit the cost effectiveness of certain plants producing asphalt mixes for
a project, because the raw materials meeting the higher quality are not within close proximity of the
asphalt plant.  Therefore, the location of asphalt plants and quarries (suitable material sources) in
reference to a project are large factors in determining which companies will bid.  Companies that own
asphalt plants near suitable material sources and close to project sites do have an advantage over
companies that do not have these resources available.  We think this factor contributes to the fact that on
many projects SCDOT has fewer than the desired number of six bidders.  The department supports strong
competition on all projects but the location of asphalt plants does impact the amount of competition that
currently exists.
Recommendation #2: The Department of Transportation should report any evidence of bid-rigging
or other forms of anti-competitive behavior to the appropriate state and federal law enforcement
agencies.
Agency Comments: The Department of Transportation certainly does not condone bid rigging or anti-
competitive behavior in any form.  If evidence of such activities is detected, the SCDOT will report such
activities to the proper authorities.
The Department has provided training to employees in anticipation of implementation of the
software mentioned in Recommendation No. 1.  We will continue to provide training in this area.  The
training enables the individuals to detect trends that may indicate possible anti-competitive behavior.  If
these trends are detected, additional analysis would be performed.  Any areas needing further
investigation would be referred to the proper authorities.
Recommendation #3: The Department of Transportation should enact a written policy requiring that
cost estimates of road paving and road construction projects be kept confidential until after the
contracts are awarded.
Agency Comments: Cost estimates of projects are required to develop the State Transportation
Improvement Plan (STIP). The STIP is required by federal regulations for budgeting and planning.
Federal regulations also require that the STIP be made available to the public.  Road paving projects are
not detailed in the STIP and the SCDOT does not release any information concerning the engineer’s
estimate for these types of projects until after award.   The Department does not release the engineer’s
estimate after award unless required by law through a freedom of information request.  The Department
will reinforce its present practice with a written policy.
Recommendation #4: The Department of Transportation should annually measure how often it meets
the federal recommended standard for the accuracy of engineer’s cost estimates.
Agency Comments: The SCDOT compares the engineer’s cost estimate with the low bid received on
a monthly basis after each letting.  There is a summary sheet produced each month that compares the total
dollar amount of the engineer’s cost estimate to the actual low bidder’s amount for all contracts. As
shown in the attached chart, the difference between these two parameters for the past two years has been
in the plus/minus 10 percent range. 
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The number of low bids received for the past two years which have been within plus or minus 10
percent of the engineer’s estimate has been a little less than the 50 percent as recommended by the FHWA
Technical Advisory Guideline T 5080.4.  However each low bid outside these parameters was analyzed
on an individual basis and met the Department’s satisfaction prior to award.  SCDOT believes there are a
number of valid reasons that contribute to this difference between the estimates and the low bid but we
certainly would like these comparisons to be in accordance with the federal guidelines.  We will have the
estimates and bids received over the past three years analyzed by a team, led by FHWA to provide
SCDOT with recommendations of any improvements that need to be made with the estimating and
present bidding approach.
An annual measurement and review of how well the SCDOT meets the federal guidelines for
accuracy of engineering cost estimates will be implemented.
  
Recommendation #5: The Department of Transportation should develop a written policy specifying
when bids are to be reviewed and rejected.
Agency Comments:  The SCDOT does use the “ten percent” guideline in reviewing the engineer’s cost
estimate. Any projects that do not fall within ten percent of the engineer’s costs estimate are reviewed in
further detail to determine if there is a reason for the differences.   There are a number of reasons that can
cause these differences such as sudden increases in material costs or factors inadvertently not considered
during the estimating process. These projects are reviewed on a case-by-case basis to determine if the best
interest of the Department and the State of South Carolina is served.
Since the vast majority of projects are federal aid projects, the Department uses the federal
guidelines in the review of bids and the determination of award of contracts.  These guidelines allow
some discretion in the analysis and review.  The Department will use the federal guidelines (Technical
Advisory T5080.6) to develop its written procedure specifying when bids are to be reviewed and rejected.
The SCDOT will partner with the FHWA in developing this procedure.
Recommendation #6: The Department of Transportation should:
• Discontinue the opening of bids at hotels and use government facilities instead.
• Ensure that bid openings are held at a time so that contractors from all parts of the state can
comfortably drive to Columbia without arriving a day early.
Agency Comments: The SCDOT has a scheduled bid opening on the second Tuesday of each month.
The SCDOT does not have a room or parking facilities of sufficient size to accommodate the bid opening
at its Park Street location and elected to contract with a local hotel as described in the LAC report.
Although the SCDOT has a contract with the local hotel through 2002, we recognize the concerns
regarding the present arrangement as pointed out in the LAC report.  It is our desire to provide a more
competitive environment therefore, the SCDOT has already begun a search to locate a government
facility large enough to accommodate the bid opening process and discontinue its contract with the local
hotel.   This change will be implemented as quickly as possible.  We expect it to take approximately three
(3) months to make the necessary arrangements to implement this change.
4
The SCDOT has been piloting an electronic bidding system (Bid Express), which will allow
contractors to submit bids electronically.  This process will allow for the submission of bids by
prequalified contractors from any location.  When fully implemented, contractors will be able to submit
their bids prior to the bid opening time and review the results from their home office as soon as the
SCDOT posts the information on the Bid Express site. Contractors will not have to travel or be present to
submit a bid or find out the results of the bid opening.  The pilot projects have gone well and we will start
accepting electronic bids in early 2002.  SCDOT and four other states are the only ones using this system
at present.  Georgia is probably farthest along with this implementation and has reported that about 90
percent of their bids are now received electronically.  Once implemented, this process will address the
concerns associated with the bid letting location and travel time.
We are also reviewing the options concerning moving the bid openings to a later time in the day.
This may allow contractors to comfortably travel from their home location to the bid opening site without
the need to secure a hotel the night before. We will review our process in light of moving the bid opening
to a non-hotel setting to ensure that any new bid opening time is appropriate. 
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